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II
Introduction .
Spain, after the settlement of the Visigoths in the fifth cen-
tury, was the slov^'est of all the European countries in developing in-
to a compact nation, a condition which was caused by the presence of
the Moors from the eighth to the fifteenth century. In 1469 Spain
was unified thru the marriage of Isabella of Castile aiid Ferdinand of
Aragon. In 1492 they succeeded in destroying the last remnant of the
political authority of the Moors in Spain.
In 1516 Ferdinand died, and Charles I (later Charles V of the
Holy Empire) becaine King. Charles had his heart in Germany, with the
result that Spain was neglected. In 1556 he abdicated his throne,
and his son Philip became King. Spain had by this time become a
mighty power in Europe, feared by all nations. In 1588 Philip* s ag-
gressive career was checked by the English, who defeated his great
Armada. His death in 1598 marked the beginning of the decline of
Spain's great power in Europe, which continued with rapidity through
the reigns of Philip III, Philip IV, and Charles III.
Up to tne end of the fifteenth century Spain and France had had
comparatively little to do with each other. During the reign of
Francis I, an intense rivalry grew up between the two countries, a
condition which lasted until 1659, when the Treaty of the Pyrenees
to cede
was signed. According to this treaty Spain was forced/to France cer-
tain portions of territory, and Louis XIV was betrothed to the
Infanta Maria Theresa.
A question of international importance came up in 1700 over the
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succession of Charles II, a degenerate childless king. There were
three claimants to the throne. Louis XIV of Prance upheld the claims
of his grandson, Philip of Aiijou, and as a result of the dispute, the
War of the Spanish Succession began in 1702. The French were on the
whole defeated, and "by the provisions of the Treaty of Utrecht, sign-
ed in 1715, Philip V was recognized as King of Spain, but was requir-
ed to renounce his claims to the French throne forever.
During the next three quarters of a century, Spain was practi-
cally the tool of France, which made use of her in a policy of aggres*
sion against England. The result was that Spain lost most of her
outlying possessions in Europe during this period. In 1788 Charles
IV ascended the throne. Between his fears of irritating the French
revolutionary governments and his desire to intercede for his kins-
man, Louis XVI, he was promptly driven into a vacillating policy,
which eventually made his country more than ever before the sport and
tool of France. First an effort was made to exclude French ideas
from Spain by suppressing all newspapers, and exacting the oath of
allegiance from all foreigners in the country (1791); then an attempt
was made to conciliate the Ifational Assembly in France, which act
isolated Ch.arles IV and made him the ally of the men who had guillo-
tined the head of his house. Thenceforth Spain was dragged at the
tail of the French Revolution, and the finger of scorn of all the
monarchical powers was pointed at the foolish vacillating king.^
Manuel Go doy, a handsome intriguing courtier was selected by
Charles IV to become his minister. He was vain, foolish, and dazzled
with his good fortune. To make matters worse, the sensual Queen fell
1 . Hume , The Spani sh People
. p . 497
.
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in love with him. Surrounded by adulators, and as "by enchantment
raised before he was twenty-five to the highest honours the King
could bestow, with supreme direction of affairs -naval
,
military, and
civil - it is not to be wondered at that he was befooled by the
French revolutionary goveriiments, and later by Napoleon. Already in
1792, when Godoy took the reins, the administration had fallen back
into corruption and confusion. The financial inflation induced by
the measures of Charles III had collapsed in the reaction, and pover-
ty and distress were general. . From motives of economy the array and
navy were neglected, but the exactions of the I'rench Revolution, to-
gether with the sacrifice of Louis in the face of the unwise protest
of Charles, dragged Spain into war with her neighbor (1793). In this
conflict she was beaten, and was forced to make a h\;aniliating peace.
Then Spain was driven by France into virar against England, aiid with
hardly a struggle to free herself, she became the bondslave of French
politicians. Her armies were scattered thruout Europe at the bidding
of Hapoleon; her fleets were shut up in French ports or exterminated
at Trafalgar; and yet the Spanish people themselves, who hated all
that was French, went on admiring their weak monarch, and cursed only
the upstart minister, whom they blamed for all their calamities.^
Napoleon's subsequent actions were no doubt based upon the con-
duct of the Spanish government during the campaign of Jena in the
autumn of 1806. Believing that Napoleon must fall before the might
of Prussia, Godoy issued a proclamation to the people, exhorting them
to make war upon their oommou enemy. This report reached Napoleon
and made him furious. But after the battle of Jena, Godoy hastened
1. Hume, The Spanish People
, pp. 497-500.

Vto send his submission and apology. Napoleon forgave him on the sur-
face, "but inwardly resolved not to expose himself again to the danger
of a stab in the back at some moment when he might be busy in Central
Europe.^ The sequel will appear in the following chapters.
1. Memoirs of Tal.lyrand
,
V. I, p. 247.

Chapter I
.
The Frei'iCh Occupatlp ii Of Spain And Portugal .
The Emperor Napoleon in order to combat England was desirous
to impose his "Continental System" upon every country on the Euro-
pean mainland, and to make this effective it was necessary that
Portugal be included in the System. In the provisions of the Treaty
of Tilsit, it was stipulated that Portugal should be compelled, by
force if necessary, to adhere to the System amd to adopt a policy
of exclusion against British goods. ^ The Prince Regent of Portugal,
John, desired to maintain some semblance of neutrality, and his
proposal to break off diplomatic relations with England did not
satisfy Napoleon. 2 On September 30, without declaring war, the
French and Spanish ambassadors were ordered to quit Lisbon at once,
and on October 18, the French army, which had been concentrating at
Bayonne since the beginning of August under the harmless name of
the "Corps of observation of the Gironde" crossed the Bidassoa at
Irun and entered Spain.
Spain came into the affair in the following fashion. For some
time Napoleon had had his eyes upon the destinies of Spain, and see-
ing a favorable opportunity, he made a secret treaty ou October 27,
1. Latimer, Spain in the 19th Century
, p. 29.
2. Napier, Peninsula War
,
p. 11.
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IQOl, '/Ins prime laiuister Godoy, trie so called "Prince of the Peace."
Tiie main provisions of this compact are as follows^ The King of
Etruria, formerly Duice of P.^rma, who had married Maria Lovisa,
Infanta of Spain, daughter of Charles IV, was to be deprived of his
Italian iiingdom, and in return to receive the northern provinces
of Portugal, the city of Oporto, and the title of King of ':?orthern
Lusitania. Oodoy was to receive the two southern provinces of
Portugal, Alentejo, and the tiny ancient kingdom of Algarve, over
which he was to reign v/ith the title of Prince of the Aigarves.
The central part of Portugal was to be occupied "by French and Span-
ish troops uxi-til the peace, waen Charles IV and Napoleon would
settle what should become of it.
According to a secret rider to this treaty, a convention sign-
ed by the same parties on tne same day stipulated tiiat French troops
should have free passage thru Spanish territory on their way to
effect the conquest of Portugal?
Napoleon lost no time in marching his soldiers, whom he had
already concentrated at Bayoiiiie, over tne Spanish frontier. The
main body was commanded by Juno t, a mediocre gexjeral, selected for
his previous knowledge of Portugal. His array proceeded thru the
northern provinces of Spain on its way to Lisbon; two other bodies
of troops poured also into Spain; one under General Duchesne, took
treacherous possession of Catalonia, its cities and its fortresses;
the other vsas divided into two corps d'armee
,
one of which was
commanded by General Dupoiit, a distinguisned soldier much esteemed
1. Le Traite'^De ib'ontai le bleau . Geoffroy de Grand Maison,
L^Sspagne et Napoleon . 1804-1309. p.9?-98.
2. Latimer, Spain in the 19 tti Century
,
p. 29.
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by Napoleon, while the otner one, under Marshal Moncey, took the
road, not into Portugal, but directly to Madrid^
The Spanish people offered no resistance whatever to the
French, who behaved in a most friendly manner. Two ci r cuius tan ?es
warranted the actionr, of the Spanish people while their country
was being invaded by foreign armies; the first was the universal
hatred of Godoy, who was blamed for the disorders of the government,
the hujniliation of the monarchy, and the state of the finances; the
second was the absorption of all public interest in the quarrel
that was taking place between fatner and pon at the Escurial and at
Madrid?
Ferdinand was undoubtedly popular with the people, who showed
their unconcealed admiration for him, on account of his hatred
against their enemy, the "Prince of the Peace," and they fixed their
hopes upon him for future reform.
Meanwhile Junot had received orders to accelerate his march
thru Spain, and to reach Oporto before the royal family of Portugal
could embark for Brazil. Juiiot, therefore, hurried his troops by
forced marches thru the mountain passes, where their sufferings
from fatigue, hunger, and thirst were beyond description. Their
efforts were in vain, for the Royal family was warned in time and
was escorted to Brazil by a British sqi;iadron under Sir Sidney Smith.
Until tne coming of the English, Junot 's Portuguese campaign
was a farce. His array having been thoroughly refreshed after its
march thru the mountains, Junot issued a proclamation announcing to
1, ^lapier, Peninsula War
,
p. 13.
2. Latimer, Spain in the 19th Century, p. 30.
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the people of Portugal, that the house of Braganza had ceased to
reign, and that the government of their country was to be administer-
ed in Napoleon's name; that the taxes would be collected in the name
and for the service of the Frencti, while their armies would be march-
ed off for foreign service under French officers! Resistance seem-
ed hopeless and the terror stricken people were left without any
initiative, because of their sovereign's desertion.
Godoj'', who had forbidden opposition to the French, believing
that they entered Spaia to further his personal motives, was thunder-
struck by Napoleon's actions. The Emperor believed that the interest
of France deraa,nded the incorporation of the northern provinces of
Spain with the French Empire. In return Charles IV was offered the
whole of Portugal, and no mention was made of Northern Lusitania, or
the principality of the Algarves; the one promised to the Xing of
Etruria, tne other to Godoy. All France was busy making preparations
for a Spanish campaign. That Napoleon did not intend to keep his
agreement may be readily observed. "This Prinoe of the Peace," said
Napoleon, "this mayor of the Palace is loathed by the nation; he is
the rascal who will himself open for me the gates of Spain.
Godoy became alarmed and wrote to his agent Izquierdo, "the
treaty no longer exists; the kingdom is covered with French troops;
the entrances to Portugal are commanded by Junot; all is intrigue
and distrust. What will be the result of these uncertainties?"
Everything looked hopeless and Godoy advised his sovereigns to
imitate the example of the Royal family of Portugal. The flight was
1. Napier, Peninsula War , p. 40.
2. Foucne, Memo ires, v. I p. 365-.
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planned for the night of March 17; but the plans leaked out, the
project was abandoned, and Godoy fell into the hands of the infuri-
ated populace. On March 20 the King signed his abdication and Ferd-
inand VII was proclaimed everywhere
Murat was appointed Napoleon's lieutenant-general in Spain, and
on March 27 he-entered Madrid without any opposition. The following
day, the Emperor wrote to his brother Louis who was then King of
Holland. "The King of Spain has just abdicated, the Prince of the
Peace has been imprisoned, and insurrectionary movements have shovm
themselves at Madrid. The people demand me with loud cries to fix
their destinies Being convinced that I shall never be able to
conclude a solid peace with England till I have accomplished a great
movement on the continent, I have resolved to put a French prince
on the throne of Spain. In this state of affairs I have turned my
eyes on you for the throne of Spain. ""^^ Louis did not accept, for he
feared the renewal of a puppet's role. Then Napoleon cast his eyes
upon his elder brother Joseph, who was laboring to do good among his
subjects in Naples.
Napoleon inquired of Izquierdo, Godoy 's secret agent, whether a
French prince would be acceptable to the Spaniards. "Sire," said
Izquierdo, "the Spaniards would accept your Majesty with enthusiasm
for their sovereign, but oiily in the event of your having previously
renounced the crown of France." Napoleon said, "If I cannot arrange
matters as I wish with either the father or son, I will make a clean
1. An excellent account may be found in Geoffrey de Grand-
Maison, Napoleon et Espa^ne
.
p. 143-159.
2. Latimer, Spain i n the 19th Century
, p. 39.

sweep of them both."-*-
Turning again to the Court of Spain, we find that Ferdinand was
persuaded against his better judgment to go to Bayonne to meet
Napoleon. There he was informed that the Bourbon dynasty was at an
end, and that it was about to be succeeded by a prince of Napoleon's
family, and that Ferdinand must renounce, for himself and for all the
princes of his family, all right to the crowns of Spain and the
Indies .2
The Prsnch aided the departure of the royal family from liiadrid;
the Spaniards .believing tnat force was being used, attacked the
French escorts. Murat issued orders; grape-shot was fired upon the
crowds. "But the roar of these cannons," says Alison, "resounded
from one end of the Peniixsula to the other; in its ultimate effects
it shook the Empire of Uapoleon to its very foundation; it was liter-
ally the beginning of the end."^
Murat was foolish and imprudent in his dealings with the Span-
iards, but it must be kept in mind that he was acting under instruct-
ions. He ordered a public execution of over one hundred Spaniards
who were caught upon the streets after the riots. The news of this
act flashed thruout Spain, and from that time a ferocious and frantic
guerilla warfare was waged against the French.
Of Murat *s civil administration, one cannot say much in praise.
He was too ignorant for a king, and was worthless in the cabinet.
The diplomacy of the battle-field ne understood, and the management
1. Latimer, Spain in the 19th Century, p. 39.
2. Geoffroy de irand Maison, Napoleon Et Espagne
.
p. 177-78.
3. Life of Wellington, V. I. p. 67.
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of 20,000 oavalry was aii easier thing than the superinteridenoe of a
province. He was not wanting in strength of courage and military
skill, but he was utterly deficient in the administration of a
province
That Napoleon deemed the Spanish situation worthy of contempt
may be seen in the following; "Believe me, Cannon, I have much
experience in these matters. Tne countries wnere the monks are
numerous are easily subjugated, and that will take place in Spain...
Even if the people v;ere to rise en mas re I could succeed in conquer-
ing them by the sacrifice of 200,000 menV ^
In the mecantime Ferdinand was forced to abdicate, and a treaty
was drawn up between Charles IV and ]:>iapoleon, by which the old King
ceded, as he said, "for the happiness and prosperity of his dear
subjects," al3 his rights over the dominions of Spain to his august
friend and ally the Emperor of the French. Ferdinand was practically
kept a prisoner until 1814.*^
1. Headley, JMapoleon And His lAarshals
,
p. 24.
2. Latimer, Spain Ixi The l^th Century
,
p. 48.
3. Geoffrey de Grand Maison, L*Espagne et Uapole'o n, p. 187-8.

-8-
Chapter II
Joseph Bonaparte Aud The War In Earnest.
Joseph Bonaparte was born in Corsica in January, 17 ""8. He was
the eldest in the family and on account of his quiet character was
destined for the priesthood. When Napoleon tecame a soldier, Joseph
desired to adopt the same career. Napoleon, however, deened him
"too indolent, too self-indulgent, too luxurious" and desired that
he should adhere to his profession. ^ At his father's death in 1785,
Joseph turned to the law. In 1787 -e wetit to Italy and finished his
law cour-'e at the University of Pisa. He sympathized with the
French Revolution and in 1792 was sent as a deputy from Corsica to
the National Convention, where be became a follower of Robespierre.
After Napoleon distinguished himself at the siege of Toulon, Joseph
received an appointment in the array as a commissary of the first
class. In 1794 he married at Marseilles, Mile. Julie Clary, the
daughter of a wealthy merchant.^
When Napoleon became first consul, Joseph was employed in
various diplorr-atic affairs. He had an active part in drawing up the
treaties of Lux^ville (1801) and the Peace of Amiens (1802). After
Napoleon became Emperor, Joseph was made a prince, and the succession
to the imperial throne of France was settled upon him and his descen-
dants in case the Emperor should leave no heirs. In 1804 Joseph
received his first military appointment, being made a colonel of
1. Latimer, Spain In The 19th Century, p. 59.
2. Atteridge, Napol eon* s Brothers, p. 17-20
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cavalry, and attached to the army waiting at Boulogne to cross over
to England. In 1805 Joseph refused the Lombard crown and in 1806 he
was sent to Naples to take charge of the trench army. As commander-
in-chief of the army, Joseph did not distinguish himself in his wars
against the bandits and gu.erillas in the mountains of Calabria.
Soon afterward Napoleon made him the King of Naples, with the under-
standing that if he refused, he would not only forfeit fraternal
affection and imperial favor, but that he woula be deprived of his
chances of succession to the i'rench throne.^
During Joseph's brief stay in Naples, he commenced many imfior-
tant reforms in matters of taxation, destruction of feudalism, and
finances. That Napoleon was displeased with Joseph's government may
easily be seen. He v;a3 far too lenient to suit Napoleon, who wrote
to him. "In a conquered country, clemeiicy is inhumani ty . . . . It is
only by salutary terror tnat you make any impression on an Italian
population.
"
On May ^1, 1808, Joseph was summoned to Eayonne, where he was
persuaded to accept the ^Spanish throne, a constitution modelled on
that of Naples was drawn up fcr Spain; and Joseph with the members
of the hastily organized Junta swore solerniily to observe it.
Joseph's accession to the throne was anriouiiced and acqiiiesced in by
all the Powers of Europe except England. As King of Spain, Joseph
did not feel himself secure, for he stated, "the fact is that there
is not a Spaniard who has declared for me, except a few who are in
some way connected with the Junta.
1. Atteridge, Napoleo n' s Brothers , p. 132.
2. Latimer, Spain In The 19th Century, p. 67.
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When Joseph arrived at Madrid, July 12, 1808, he found the
people bitterly exasperated. He assemloled a number of notables to-
gether and promised to call a Cortes, whose business it should be to
decide the great question, "should he, or should he not, be King of
Spain." He also said that he would not consent to any dismemberment
of the Spanish Kingdom, and that the Prench troops should evacuate as
soon as peace was declared.
Within a few days of the riots at Madrid, all Spain rose en
masse for its dero^o-ed candidate Perdinand. It wao essentially a
popular insurrection. The clergy was heartily in sympathy with the
masses; preached resistance to French arms, and proclaimed the kill -
ing of a Frenciman a meritorious act. The war in Spain was never a
regular war. Victories won i:i Germany would give opportunity for
controlling the people and keeping up the commissary department; in
Spain a victory meant nothing. The populace evacuated at the ap-
proach of French troops, aiid destroyed or carried off supplies;
wells were filled up, springs were poisoned, isolated detachments
massacred, and prisoners tortured; and the topography essentially
favored this mode of guerilla warfare.-^
Spain was an exceedingly bad country in which to manoeuvre
troops in the Napoleonic style, and it took some considerable time
before the Emperor's subordinates could assimilate the new mode of
warfare. Spain is cut up by irregular mountain ranges, and moreover
was il"i -provided with roads, a factor which proved to be disastrous
to the French arms, inasmuch as difficult communications prevented
success or failure by armies in one place from affecting armies in
1. Dodge, Eapoleon, V. 3, p. 25.
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in other places. When a marshal overran one province, his success
in no wise aided his brother marshal, who was striving to subdue a
neighboring one. This was caused by the fact that it took weeks to
transport supplies across intervening ranges and rivers. The chief
difficult}/- in campaigning in Spain was the question of food supply;
armies could not live off the country and remain effective. As
Henry IV had rightly said: "In Spain large armies will starve, and
small ones will get beaten.
The paper strengtn of the Spanish forces was about 130,000.
The officers were inefficient; while the men were brave, but lack of
discipline made them weak as an efficient fighting force. Summing
up the faults of the Spanish army, its depleted battalions, its small
and incompetent cavalry force, its insufficient proportion of artill-
ery, and its utter want of commissariat, we find that its main source
of weakness was that while tne long wars of the French revolution
had induced all the other nations of Europe to overhaul their mili-
tary organization and learxi sometning from t.ae methods of the French,
Spain was still, so far as its army was concerned, in the middle of
the 18th century.*" The national temperament, with its eternid
relegation of all troublesome reforms to the morrow, was no doubt
largely to blame. To (lodoy the carpet-soldier is due the mili-
tary decadence of the Spanish army.
At the outbreak of the war, the French forces amounted to
101,000 men. They were distributed as follows: Corps of the Easterr
Pyrenees, t>eneral Duhesme, 20,000 men; Corps of Aragon, General
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 14.
2. Oman, The Peninsular War , V. I, p. 256.
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Verdier, 16,000 men; Corps of Madrid, Marshal Moncey, 18,000 men;
Corps of General Dupont, 25, 000 men; Corps of the Western Pyrenees,
Marshal Bessierefs, 22,000 men. The troops were for the most part
conscripts; about 36,000 men were veterans. Junot had a large vet-
eran force, Moncey and Bessieres had few. Dupont 's men had been
drilled only in camp, a fact which in part explains the defeat at
Eaylen.^
At first the military outlook seemed bright. Junot was in
Lisbon, Bessieres with headquarters at Burgos; Duhesme was in Cata-
lonia, and Dupont was on the Tagus, near Toledo. Napoleon wrote to
Bessieres, June 16, axid said, "In civil wars it is the important
places that one should defend. We ought not to go everywhere.
A Spanish army was put to flight by Marshal Moncey at Cuenca.
The victory was a mediocre one, inasmuch as the French were obliged
to retire to Andalusia, liflarslial Bessieres had his hands full with
the uprisings in LogroriJ3, Valencia.
In Aragon, stiff resistance was encouxitered under the leader-
ship of General Palafox who was eventually defeated by General
Lefebre and shut up at Logrotio,] Events were rapid and successful
and Napoleon was jubilant.
Meanwhile a storm was gathering in the Northwest. England had
awakened to the fact that she could effectively foil Napoleon's
continental system by taking possession of the Peninsula, which lay
open to her fleets. She had promised aid to the various Juntas and
1. Confidential Correspondenc e Between Napoleon and Joseph.
V. I, p. 332.
2. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 26.
\
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sent thousands of much needed muskets and other materials. Rein-
forcements under General Blake, a soldier of fortune, were on their
way from Portugal. A junction was made with General Cuesta, comman-
der-in-chief of the Spanish armies, who was a narrow minded and
inefficient soldier. The two forces united at Astorga and advanced
on the Esla. This array tempted l^rshal Besr:iieres and on July 14,
he marched out with 14,000 men and met the enemy on the heights of
Medina de Rio Seco. The Spaniards, some 22,000 stronfi;, stood in two
"bodies under Cuesta on the right and i31ake on the left; they were
however too far apart for tactical cooperation. BessieVes charged
the centre with cavalry and. turiied Blake's flank. The total Spanish
loss amounted to 5,000 men and a number of guns. The French losses
were insignificant. "Bessieres iiad put my brother Joseph on the
throne of Spain," exclaimed Nj-poleon. On July 17, the Emperor wrote
him, "IJever was battle gai iied under more important circumstances.
It had decided the affairs of Spain. "1
In the meantime, Dupont started out with 12,000 men from Toledo
late in iilay to join hands with the French fleet at Cadiz. General
Dupont was a favorite of Napoleon because thru his persorkil efforts
the victory of Ulm had been made possible. He was expected to win
his mar::?hal*3 spurs in Spain, but circumstances willed it otherwise.
His troops, mainly conscripts, were trained in camp only, and ill-
prepared to undertake the serious work at hand. To send a column of
12,000 men on a march thru 300 miles of hosti'^e territory to Cadiz,
presupposes the idea that the expedition was merely an affair of
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 28-29.
2. Oman, Tne Peninsular Campaign , V. I, p. 126.
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policing. It was a military crime of the first order to aend troops
of such quality on such an imoortant expedition. At first Cupont
met with no opposition, but when ne crossed the Sierra Morena and
reached Andrujar June 7, he learned the serious tidings, that the
French squadron was captured, that Andalusia was in arms, and that
he was surrounded on all sides by nujmerous guerillas.-^ To sustain
the irregulars, the Junta appointed General Castanos to raise a
regular army in the re^^r of Dupont's array. The latter wished to
make a trial of their strength and pushed on to within six miles of
Cordova, and at --vlcolea, he encountered 12,000 hastily dTa.mi up
peasants under General Ecnavarri . These were swept aside with ease
and the next step was to take the city of Cordova* This place was
the scene of horrible deeds, for Dupont's army of conscripts con-
ducted themselves in tiie manner of Tilly's and Vi/allenstein' s hordes.
Cordova was sacKed and pillaged and the inhabitaxits suffered in-
numerable irijuries and horrors; for which the French thruou t Spain
were destined to pay dearly. Over 500 wagon loads of plunder were
carried away.
It was not long until Dupont realized that he was utterly cut
off from any help, inasmuch as his lines of communications were
closed. He fell 'oack very slowly. If he had only kept his wits
about him, ne would have had amx'le opportunities to extricate him-
self from the difficult position. Instead of acting with swift de-
cision he wasted a whole month at -rt-udujar with the result that he
was soon surrounded by 40,000 regulars with good artillery under
Generals Castanos and Ivediiig, the latter being a car able Swiss
1. Oman, Tne Peninsular Vvar, V. I, p. 129. .
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officer.^ General Vedel sought to reinforce Dupont, but Reding siez-
ed Eaylen and kept the French forces from active cooperation. In-
stead of consolidating his position, Dupont resolved to cut his way-
thru the enemy. His failure cost him 2,000 men. Tne French con-
scripts became discouraged, and being tired out and thirsty, they
would not fight any longer in the face of so many odds. Dupont de-
manded a truce, and rejected General Veroier's advice to fight. The
enemy would niDt listen to Dupont 's proposals and a surrender was ar-
ranged. It has been suggested that the French were more than desir-
ous to surrender in order to preserve their ill gotten booty.
^
Thus thru Dupont 's inefficiency and stupidity, the Spaniards
were enabled to beat and capture an entire French array in the field,
a feat which no continental nation had accomplished since the wars
of the Revolution began. It might be added that the Spaniards never
carried out their promise concerning the safe passage of the French
troops to France, partly because of England's refusal to convey the
troops in her ships. Instead, the French were marched to Cadiz, and
there they were confined in rotten hulks in the Bay of Cadiz, and
the survivors were later interned in the Balearic Islands where a
great portion perished before their release in 1814. Upon his ar-
rival in France Dupont >Aas imprisoned by I^apoleon until 1814.
Wnen Josenh, who had been king in Itedrid Just a week, heard of
the disaster, he beat a hasty retreat on July 29.*^ All the French
troops in Spain were recalled, and shortly afterward the Spaniards
1. Oman, The Peninsular War , V. I, p. 20?.
2. Geoffrey de Grand Mai son, L'Espagne et Napoleon
, p. 305-6
3. Confidential Co rresponde nce , V. II, p. 353.
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entered Madrid in triumph.
When Napoleon heard of Baylen, all his plans were upset, but
with marvellous rapidity he formed new ones and ordered half the
Grand Army towards Spain. Over 100,000 veterans under Marshal
Victor, Soult, Marchand, and Mo rtier composed the new army and it
seemed as if Baylen would be avenged in earnest. He made careful
preparations, and stated, "I will leave in a few days to put myself
at the head of my army, and with the help of G-od, crown myself in
Madrid, the King of Spain, and plant ray eagles on the forts of
Lisbon."^
The defeat of Baylen encouraged the Spaniards to a high pitch,
and it proved that mere numbers could accomplish nothing in the
Peninsula. Good troops were needed, and as we have noted, the Grand
Array was weakened in order to strengthen the armies in Spain.
Uapoleon said, "I must gc there myself to wind the machine up."^
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 33.
2. Ibid, p. 35.
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Chapter III
The English Enter The Peninsular War
In the tegimiing Junot found his Portuguese task a relatively
simple matter, but now he found himself in a serious position, for
after Eaylen, his lixies of communications with Spain were cut off;
and in order to consolidate his perilous position Jui.ot recalled
scattered detachments and concentrated his army of ?-5,000 around
Lisbon. All Portugal became hostile, and to niake matters worse, the
promised British reinforcements were at last on their way to par-
ticipate in the coming struggle. Of the four divisions sent over,
one was commanded by the future great Duke of WelHngton.
Arthur Wellesley was born in 1739 and received his education at
Eton. At the age of seventeen he entered the army as ensign; but
pushed by family interests he soon rose as an officer. He was sub-
sequently sent to India, v/here he distinguished himself at the battle
of Assaye.l For this victory he was made a Major General. In 1805
Vi/ellesley went back to Jingland, and after some inaction he was made
a lieutenant-general in July, 1808, thru the political influence of
his friends. iVlany of nis enemies declared at that time that
Wellesley was more of a politiciaii than a general. Wellesley com-
manded 10,000 in the coming Portuguese campaign. The British ex-
pedition nujnbering 30,000 men landed at Mondego Bay, and advanced
along the coast in order to keep in touch with the fleet.
Junot left Lisbon August 11 and sent General Delaborde ahead
1. Oman, Wellingtp xi ' s ^ rmy , p. 39.
f
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to engage the Britisn. Weliesley however, defeated Lelaborde at
Rollca and compelled hira to fall back.^ Junot, being over-confident,
decided to risk everything in one battle, aiid in accordance with his
plans, he decided to attack t re British, v;ho held a strong position
jt Vimiero. On the day of the battle, Weliesley was superseded by
General Burrard, a very timid and inefficient officer. V/ithout him
the British v/ould undoubtably have captured the entire French army.
The English numbered 17,761 and trie French abou*!: 20,000. Junot
attac i'ed at too many points, with the result that each attack wa^
repulsed by the English, who were content to fight a defensive battle
After a few well organized cnarges, the French were forced to retreat
in confusion. Weliesley said to his superior, "Sir Harry, now is
your time to advance, the enemy is completely beaten, and we shall
be in Lisbon within three days. "2 .lig superior refused, saying that
the English army had accomplished eiiough in one day. The battle was
won by the use of superior tactics, in which the close Napoleonic
formations were beaten by the English regimeiits, which were placed
in a line two deep.
After the battle of Vimiero, Junot retired to Torres Vedraa.
Thru shrewd diplomacy on the part of Junot *s subordinate, General
Kellerman, a very favorable armistice was concluded with the Eng-
lish."*^ According to the armistice, which was wrongfully designated
as the Convention of Ciatra, Lisbon was to be handed over to the
English, while the Frencn were to be taken on board English siiips
j^A.fg Q-^ ygljifiStpn, V. I, p. 211.
2. Oman, V. I, p. 432-3.
3. Gu rwood. Supplementary Dispatche s^ p. 114".
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and landed at La Rochelle, with all their baggage and equipment.
The convention was ridiculed everywhere in Ex-gland and Portugal,
"because its stipulations were too liberal. A court of inquiry was
held in England, and Wellington testified, "that if General Hill's
brigade had moved forward with the advance guard upon Torres Vedras,
as soon as it was certain the enemies' s right had been defeated by
our left, and our left had pursued their advantage, the enemy would
have been cut off from Torres Vedras, and we should have been at
Lisbon before him. But Sir Harry Burrard still thought it advisable
not to move from Vimiero, and the enemy made good their retreat to
Torres Vedras. "-^ The court however acquitted the commanding officer;
and Welling toii in disgust and chagrin, left the army and entered
poli ti cs .
1. Grurwood, Supplementary Pi sp a t cjie b
,
p. 123.
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Chapter IV
Napoleo n In Spain
After lta,poleoii made sure that the Treaty of Tilsit was a real-
ity and not a pretense between Prance and Russia, he was enabled to
devote himself to the Spanish situation, which looked dark indeed
for the Prench cause. At the time that Uapoleon took personal charge
of the headquarters at Vittoria, the Irench armies had either cap-
itulated to the English at C intra or to the Spaniards at Baylen, or
had retired beyond the Ebro
Upon "his arrival at B^yonne, Napoleon, the most provident, the
most powerful of administrators, and tne best obeyed of generals,
found that his orders, both as to the preparations for the campaign
and as to the management of the war, had been ill -followed. ^ The
army was without clothing, and instead of being kept together near
Vittoria, the left had been sent as far as Lerida to the Ea-t, and
the right under Marshal Lefebre and Marshal Victor, had marched to
the West to attack the Spaniards under iJlake, had defeated him,
entered Brlbao, and pu'?hed on towards Valiraseda. Lefebre in want of
supplies fell back on Bilbao, and Victor, hearing of the Emperor*
s
arrival, and axucious to return to headquarters, where he would be
under !Sapoleon's eyes, marched towards Vittoria, leaving General
Villate exposed to attack by superior forces. "Thus, "says Thiers,"
began the series of faults, the results of selfishness and the
jealousy of our generals, which lost the cause of France in Spain,
1 . Conf i de nt ia1 Correspondence Between Joseph and Nayoleon
,
V. I, p. 353.
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and hy losing it in Spa.in» lost it also in Europe,
The army of Spain consisted of six corps under: 1. Victor,
28,000 men; 2. Soult,26,000 men; 3. Lannes ,21 , 000 men; 4. Lefebre
,
25,000 men; 5. St. Cyr,36,000 men; 6. Ney,32,000 men; with reserves
of 34,000. Later two other corps came to Spain; 7. Mortier ,30, 000
;
8. Junot,19,000 men, making in all about 250,000 men. 2 The French
were confident, as is brought out in General Berthier's letter to
his wife of November 14. "Everywhere our armies are beating the
Spanish rebels In English pay..". ..The people corne forward to meet us.
We have already destroyed two armies Here we are near Madrid, and
soon this war will be finished."^
In his campaign for Madrid, Napoleon elected as usual to live
on the country. The Spanish lines were weak, especially in the
centre, and at the battle of Espinosa, November 10, Victor defeated
the Spaniards under Blake and La Romana. On November 23, General
Lannes defeated General Castanos at Tudela, who escaped the care-
fully arranged trap which Napoleon had set. "If Marshal Ney had not
let himself be deceived by the inhabitants, and had not remained
till the 23rd and 24th at Soria, because he imagined that the Span-
iards had 80,000 mexi, he would have arrived at Agreda as I had order-
ed, and not a man would have escaped."'^
By the defeats of the right and left wings of the Spanish
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 61.
2. Confi dential Correspondence Between Joseph and Napoleon
V. I, p. 377.
3. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 63.
4. Co rre spo ndence De Napoleon . V. 18, p. 84.
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armies, Napoleon aocornpli8lied nothing; each wing was in a position
to rally for a fresh effort. Napoleon wa^ not accustomed to such
campaigning; inorder to reduce the country it was necessary to carry
on isolated campaigns. As Oman said, "to endeavor to grasp a Span-
ish Corps was like clutching at a ball of quicksilver; the mass dis-
persed in driblets iietween the fingers of the manipulator, and the
small rolling pellets ultimately united to form a new force.
Napoleon marched on Madrid with 40,000 men. At Somo Sierra,
resistance was encountered, the mountain road being barred by a Span
is 1 force. Without waiting for his guns, he hurled a company of
Polish Lancers against the Spanish artillery. The mexi were needless
ly mown do^m and sacrificed for Napoleon* s love of display of the
theatrical. Within a few days Madrid fell without any fighting,
and when the Spanish field forces heard of the surrender they turned
back hastily; and their retreat was almost a rout. Napoleon endeav-
ored to conciliate the people in Madrid, but they would not accept
anything from a foreign conqueror.
Returning again to the iCnglish operations, we find that the
British army was under Sir John I-'oore's command, ^ith orders to
march from Lisbon to Corunim. uow this meant a hard march of almost
300 miles, with only the half hearted cooperation of the Spaniards.
Sir John Moore was given the following instructions; "You are
authorized to give the most distinct assurances to the Spanish
people, that his majesty in sending a force to their assistance, has
no other object iu view than to afford them the most unqualified
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 64.
2. Geoffrey de Grandmaison, L^Sspagne e t Napoleon
, p. 379.
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and disinterested support that his Majesty's endeavors are to be"
directed to aid the people of Spaixi in restoring and maintaining
against France the independence and integrity of taeir monarchy.""^
Moore committed a serious error by sending his army over three
different roads, a measure which was dangerous, for the French were
on the offensive. Moore reached Salamanca with his main body of
troops on November 2 0, and -/dien he neard of the fall of Madrid, he
was uMecided what to do. After some hesitation he made up his
mind to cut off the French lines of communication and cooperate with
the Spaniards under La Romiana at Burgos. Lack of information de-
ceived NapoleonastoMoore' 8 activities, aid not knowing that the
enemy was in his rear, he ordered Soult into Portugal.^
By means of a captured army order, Moore was enabled to ascer-
tain the disposition of the French forces, and he also learned that
Napoleon knew nothing of his movements.^ By a brilliant manoeuvre,
Moore got in front cyf Soult*s army, which tried to hold him back.
By this time however. Napoleon learned of Moore's strategy thru es-
caped prisoners from Salamanca, and he conceived a scheme whereby
the enemy's retreat would be cut off. In o-cder to accomplish this
it was necessary to send Ney across the (Juadarrama Mountains. The
passage across the mountains was accompli shed with great difficulty
and many men lost their lives on account of tne cold weather. On
December 24, Moore was ready to attack md crush Soult at Sahagum,
bu.t upon learning of l^iey's strategy he beat a hasty retreat. Thus
1. Gurwood, Dispatches , p. 18.
2. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 117.
3. Oman, V. I, p. 5 30.
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Moore was enabled to escape from a deadly trap. The Emperor said,
"If the English remain in their positions until Ney joins Soult, they
are lost and not a man will escape."^ During these operations
Napoleon took an active part, but upon receipt of serious news from
Austria, he turned over the task of following up Moore to Soult and
Key. In a letter to Joseph of January lr,1809, he wrote, "If you
think it wise, you can keep my absence secret for a fortnight, say-
ing that I have gone to Saragossa. The Court of Vienna is behaving
very ill, but might repent. Have no disquiet, I have enough forces,
even without touching my amy of Spain, to go to Vienna in a month."
Moore's retreat to Corunns. was a tragic one.-^ Every:vhere the
English were beset by the attacks of the French, and had it not Itjen
for Moore's cavalry, the retreat would have degenerated into a rout.
The strain was so great that several regiments mutinied, as a result
of having partaken of too much intoxicants. Over 4,000 men were lost
during the retreat, and as Moore was about to embark his army at
Corunna, he was attacked by Soult on the 15th of January. After a
typical English defensive battle, the i'rench were driven off. How-
ever, the English commander laid down his life on the battlefield,
struck by a stray cannon ball.'^ He was buried with military honors
on tne spot where he died, and later the i'rench commander Soult
placed a monument there in honor of the brave soldier.
1. Geoffroy De Grandma i son, L'Espagne Et Hapol e'en, p. 424.
2. Coiifidential Correspondence of Napoleon and Joseph , V. II,
p. 31
.
3. Geoffroy De Grandraaison, L'Espagne Et Nanoleon . p. 430-433,
4. Ibid .
,
p
.
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Moore was severely criticized for not defending Corunna, which
although not a strong place, could be aided by the fleet; in the
worst extremity he could have embarked. The remnants of the English
army sailed for England, where every observer was astonished at the
shocking condition of the soldiers. Over half the expedition, number-
ing 26,000j bad been rendered unfit for further service.
Summing up the situation at the close of February, 1809, we find
that England had been driveii out of Spain, and the resistance of the
Spanish troops had become confined to the defence of a few towns and
a guerilla warfare in the Southwestern provinces. Joseph v/as again
in Madrid, and Napoleon forced him to call himself King of Spain,
and commander-in-chief of the French armies; but in reality neither
was his royalty recognized by the Spaniards, except ^Adthin the countr;
'
occupied by the French array, nor were his commands obeyed by the
French.
^
1 . Confidential Correspondence Betwee n IJapoleon and Joseph
,
V. I, p. 368.
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Chapter V
The Two Sieges of^ Saragp 8sa
.
While Dupoiit was on his ill-fated expeditioii into Andalusia,
Lefebre and Verdier undertook to effect the conquest of Aragon. In-
order to accomplish this they had to take Saragos sa, which was the
key to the province.
Scjragossa was situated on the right bank of the Ebro, and was
ill -equipped to withstand a protracted siege. It boasted of an old
wall, with a series of large and strong buildings, which could not
be taken without making a breach. The city was commanded by Palafox,
a brave officer, aided by a Belgian officer, Saint Mars. On June 29,
1808, 2,000 Frenoh troops made the first attack against the gate of
El Carmen. They met with extraordinary resistance; men, women, and
even children joined against the invader. 2Jeverthele?«s the French
could not be denied, and after an assault on August 4, the Portillo
Gate was taken, and it was only a matter of time, until they gained
the Centre of the town. To Verdier' s demand for a capitulation,
Palafox replied by "war to tne deatn."^ The street battles were
carried on for a week, and the irench were on the point of taking the
city, but on account of Dupont's surrender at Baylen, they were forc-
ed to retire.
After the French had left, Saragossa was strengthened consider-
ably. The old walls were patched up; numerous guns were mounted,
and earthworks were thro'^ up in front of the walls. The tovm was
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 2, p. 122.
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well provisioned to withstand a long siege, and England sent abundant
ainmu nit ion
.
Late in December, 1808, when Napoleon was campaigning against
Moore, Mortier joined with Moncey and commenced the second siege of
Saragossa, which was even more terrible than the first. The French
had 30,000 veteran troops, 60 guns, and a corps of sappers and min-
ers. WitMn the walls of Saragossa there were 32,000 regulars,
2,000 cavalry, 15,000 well armed peasants, and an equal number of
inhabitants. On January 2, Junot superseded Moncey, and captured the
Convent of St. Joseph on January 12. After a bombardment of tv^enty-
four hours from fifty guns, the wall was taken. To take the wall
however, was not to capture the town, which could not be teiken by
assault, inasmuch as every house Wds converted into a fortress, and
was defended by unexampled heroism.
The fighting was incessant; a constant bombardment, the explo-
sion of mines, the crash of falling buildirjgs, clamorous shouts, and
the continual echo of musketry deafened the ear, while volumes of
smoke and dust, clouding the atmosphere, lowered continually over the
heads of the combatants, as hour by hour, the French, with a terrible
perseverance, pushed forward their approaches to the heart of the
miserable but glorious city.^ Tiie inhabitants resisted so valiantly
that the French were exhausted from their efforts. In spite of all
they had accomplished, Saragossa remained unccnquered. "Before this
siege," they exclaimed, "was it ever known, that 20,000 men should
besiege 50,000? Scarcely a fourth of the town is won, and we are
already exhausted. We must wait for reinforcements, or we shall
1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 138.
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perish among these cursed ruina, which shall become our own tombs,
before we can force the last of these fanatics from the last of
their dens."^
On February 2, Marshal Lannes arrived in the midst of these
complaints, and from that time on the siege was prosecuted to the
advantage of the French. By means of "normous quantities -^f powder,
the principal churches and buildings were destroyed, and it was soon
evident that the town must fall. The inhabitants were in dire
straits, the daily deaths ranged from 400 to 500, and thousands of
bodies were left unburied. Palafox was sick ;ind most of the other
chiefs were killed, so that there was no logical leader. A new
JuntA was chosen which proposed a capitulation with Marshal Lannes
on February 20. After some negotiations it was agreed upon that the
regular garrison was to be marched off to France as prisoners of war.
The peasants were to be sent home; and religion and property were to
be guaranteed*^ Over half the population and two thirds of the
garrison, amounting in all to 50, 000, perished during the siege. The
French lost about 3,000 men.*^
1. Dodge, Ilapoleon . V. 3, p. 123.
2 . Me'mo i re r du Roi Joseph, V . 5 , p . 41 4
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Chapter VI
Renewal Of The French Offensive In Portugal .
Inorder to repair Ju.not*s disaster at Cintra, Napoleon resolved
to undertake a new offensive. In accordance with his plans, Soult
was placed in command of the iTrench army of invasion. In the inter-
val between the two invasions, Portugal was considerably strengthen-
ed. The whole male population from eighteen to sixty was in the
ranks, and English officers drilled and organized tnem into regiments
Soult began his operations in February, 1809, with 26,000
troops, and his immediate objective was Oporto which he desired to
convert into a base of operations against Lisbon. At Braga, Soult
defeated the brave but ill -disciplined peasants,^ and on March 26,
Oporto was reached. Tnere the progress of the French was barred by
50,000 Portuguese with two hundred guns.'^- Tnese were swept aside,
and on March 28, the city was stormed and sacked. The French lost
about 500 men, tne Portuguese about 10,000; most of these were
drowned when the Douro Bridge broke dov/n.3
Soult' 3 furTiher movements were handicapped by popular uprisings,
and lack of communication with his colleagues. On the same day,
March 28, Victor defeated the Spaniards at Mengabriel ; the day before
Sebastiani had beaten the Army of Andalusia at Ciudal Real, and
driven it into the mountains.'^ These victories decided nothing;
1. Napier, Peninsular War , p. 167.
2. Ibid
,
p. 17.3.
3. Dodge. Napoleon , V. 5, p. 339.
4. Napier, Peninsula War
,
p. 176.
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af ter eaoh defeat, a fresh army would always appear to contest the
victory. The people showed no signs of subjugation, and 'by the end
of April, Cuesta had 30»000 men, with tae result that Victor could
not advance with such a formidable force in his rear. Ney was held
at bay with 18,000 by the insurgents of Gralicia, and as a result
Soult was deprived of the aid which was promised hira. The seat of
the whole trouble was the jealousy among the marshalsj one would not
cooperate with the other; a leader like Uapoleon could combine the
operations to advantage, but as it was, Napoleon's lieutenants were
left to their own devices. By May 2, Soult was in hard straits.
He was shut up in Oporto by tne Portuguese, and the English under
Wellesley were making preparations to attack him.
When tiie English entered Por.tugal in 1807, everything was in
confusion; the regular army consisted of about 12,000 men; the
militia existed only on paper, every peasant was a guerilla, and the
clergy had kept the land ignorant and savage. The English changed
all this. Their officers organized and drilled fresh troops, and
soon the Portuguese army under Beresford excee led 50, 000 men; while
the territorial troops o rdi lianzas grew to be fairly efficient."^
Wellington reached Lisbon on April 22. rre was made Marshal General
of Portugal and had 26,000 British and Hanoverian troops a=? a
nucleus for his army.
After making preparations to cover Lisbon from Victor, Wellesle;
made ready to surprise Soult who was unaware of his movements. Soult
being ignorant of what was going on, decided to make a flank move-
ment into the Salamanca country, and in pursuance of his plans, he
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 341.
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scattered his troops most unwisely. In the meantime the English,
numbering 16,000, marched towards the Vouga River and surprised the
French. The latter were quickly defeated and retreated across the
Douro after destroying tne bridge. Vi/itn treason and insurrection on
all sides, Soult acted wisely.-^ He ordered his subordinates to fall
back with the stores axid guns, and he himself made preparations to
hold his position until his scattered detachments could join him.
Being misinformed by conspirators, Soult' s commands were not carried
out, wit a the result that the English were enabled to concentrate
unnoticed behind a rocky height opposite Oporto.
2
The negligence of the French pickets above Oporto was remark-
able. Wellesley decided to cross tne river in the face of a veteran
army, and with the help of a native, ne was enabled to obtain three
barges. The English crossed the river and were among the French
before they were discovered. After severe fighting the French beat
a hasty retreat, having lost 500 men and large stores of supplies.*^
The French retreat was so precipi tatethat Wellington sat down to the
dinner which had been prepared for Soult.
^
Soult had depended upon General Loison to hold Amaranto , which
would keep his line intact, but when the latter evacuated it, Soult
1. Napier, Peninsula War
,
p. 189-190.
It is believed that Soult conceived an ambition to become
King of Portugal; this caused a faction to hold communica-
tion with the enemy.
2. Napier, Peninsula Battles
,
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4. Bodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 345.
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was placed in desperate circujnstances . The situation was parallel
to that at Baylen. The weather was beyond endurance, the troops
complained bitterly and it seemed as if a capitulation would be de-
manded. Although wounded, Soult rose to the occasioii and quieted
the hostile murmurings of his troops. As a result of information
received from a Spanish pedlar, who told him of a path by which he
could escape, Soult destroyed his guns, abandoned his baggage, and
with terrible difficulties he succeeded in crossing the Catalina
Ridge, being joined by Loison at Guimaraens.^ Wellington followed
closely, but Soult baffled him again by taking to the mountains. In
order to prevent treachery, the army was reorganized at Braga.
Loison was given the conunaud of the advance, while Soult took command
of the rear himself. The retreat was conducted in a masterly manner.
Everywhere the guerillas blocked the i'rench, the peasants tortured
the wounded soldiers; the troops in revenge shot the peasants, and
the smoke from burning houses traced the line of march. The retreat
cost the French 5,000 men and all their artillery and baggage. Soult
had been caught napping and on the whole, the French were extremely
fortunate to escape. Mapoleon was deeply chagrined at the turn of
events and said bitterlyJ "Victor ought to have undertaken move-
ments; instead of that, I see with lively pain that they let the
enemy manoeuvre at his ease against Soult; and if this marshal meets
a check, the loss of Spain will follow.
Thinking that Soult* s array was incapacitated for further cam-
paigning, Wellesley undertook to Join with the Spaniards under Cuesta
1. Napier, Peuinsula, Battles, p. 25.
2. Dodge, Uapoleon , V. 3, p. 345.
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and Venegas upon Madrid. He relied too much upon Spanish promises;
they boasted of their strength and successes against the French, with
the result that Wellington was hoodwinked. The French held a strong
position near Talavera under King Joseph, Victor, and Sebastian!.
Their combined forces amounted to 50,000 men. Wellesley had 18,000
infantry and 3, JOO cavalry; Cuesta was with 37,000 men at Al.maraz,
and Venegas was at La Ivlancha with 25,000. The Spaniards assured
Wellesley of their heartiest cooperation; but as a matter of fact,
the contracts for provisions were soon broken, and the English almost
starved among their friends. Wellesley joined Cuesta on July 18,
but the Spani;ird was sullen, obstinate, and jealous of the English
general. In .order to deprive tne English of any glory Cuesta marched
against Madrid, and was severely beaten by Joseph at the Guadarrama .1
The allies took their position at Talavera; the Spanish were
placed on the left, while the English held the weakest part of the
line. The first day's battle was favorable to the French, and
o
Wellesley barely escaped capture.*" The French were foolish for at-
tacking; Soult was coming with 50,000 men, and he promised to be on
the scene within forty -eight hours. Had Joseph been only willing to
wait, the fate of Spain would have been sealed. Instead, Joseph
yielded to Victor's argument in favor of instant battle. The latter
said, "I will give up war, if I cannot take that hill.""^ V/ellesley
fought a defensive battle and won it in spite of repeated assaults
by the French. Talavera was a battle of discussion and indecisive
1. Napier, Peninsula Battle s, p. 29.
2. Ibid
, p. 31.
3. Me^no i resdu Roi Joseph . V. 6, p. 239.
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attaclf for the "French. Had they only waited for Soult, the game was
theirs. Napoleon described it best. On August 18 he wrote. "What
a fine chance they missed; 30,000 English in front of 100,000 of the
best troops in the world. My God, what is an army without a chief*. "1
The English lost 6,264 man; the French lost 7,389 men and seventeen
guns. The Spanish losses were not ascertained. Talavera principally
shows able defensive battle -tactics on the part of the English, and
gallantry ill -directed on the part of the French.
Joseph sent a false report of the battle to Napoleon, but the
latter would not be duped, and criticized the whole operations
severely. "State to the King my astonishment, and ray discontent to
Jourdon, that they should send me a song and dance report, and that
instead of letting me know the true situation of things, they should
present to me school -boy* s essays. "'"^
In the meantime Wellesley's position was fast becoming danger-
ous, for Soult was marching towards Plascentia^ a movement which
threatened the English rear. Soult masked Ciudad Rodrigo, and reach-
ed Plascentia ou Augu.st 2. Wellesley miscalculated his opponent's
strength, but by means of a captured dispatch, he was awakened to his
danger and beat a hasty retreat. The hospitals with 5,000 English
wounded were abandoned at Talavera. Wellesley was enabled to make
good his retreat upon Badajoz, with the aid of Spanish peasants who
mended the only practical road across the mountains.
Soult now proposed to march on Abrantes and cut off the English
from Portugal, but Joseph would not consider such a move. With con-
1. Dodge, Napoleon . V. 3, p. 362.
2. Ibid
,
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siderable ill -judgment, Joseph sent Ney and Sebastian! against the
Spaniard?, retaining no considerable force with which to act de-
cisively. Joseph is to be deeply criticized, for had he marched
upon Badajoz with a sufficient force, he would in all probability
have defeated the Anglo -Portuguese forces decisively. This was the
most important moment of the Spanish war, for the chances are that
if Wellesley had suffered a crushing setback, the English ministry
might have decided to evacuate the ±eninsula; and from a military
standpoint, Joseph lost a golden opportunity to strike his opponents
a telling blow.^
Wellesley lost confidence in the Spaniards; they supplied him
with scant provisions, and he made up his mind that he would be
better off in Portugal. Furthermore he characterized the Spanish
cavalry as being good play soldiers, and affirmed that the infantry
was worthless against the French. "I have fished in many troubled
waters but Spanish troubled waters I will never try again: thus
said Sir Arthur Wellesley after the campaign of Talavera, by which
he acquired the title of Viscount Wellington, and a thorough know-
ledge of Spanish character.
The Spanish Junta, dissatisfied with the failure of its armies,
consolidated the armies of Cuesta and Venegas under Areizaga. Proud
to command 50,000 men, Areizaga advanced upon Aranjuez, where he was
confronted by Sebastiani on Uoveraber 12.^ The latter kept the enemy
at bay, until Soult and Mortier arrived, and although outnumbered
1. Dodge, Nap oleon . V. 3, p. 370.
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by the Spaniards the French succeeded in winning a great victory.
The Spaniards lost 11,000 killed, 16,000 prisoners, 50 guns and 30
flags
.
Wellington was content to defend Portugal and leave the Span-
iards to their fate. Inorder to make future operations as safe as
possible, he determined to create a powerful b^se. He desired ample
means of reinforcements and supplies to annoy and wear out the
French; and with this purpose in view, he constructed in absolute
secrecy, an enormous fortified camp on the heights of Torres Vedras,
extending from the mouth of the Tagua to the sea, which cut off from
the mainland the peninsula in which Lisbon is situated.^
Tiie operations in Spain, ending in 1809, were distinctly in
favor of the French. The English were driven out of Spain, and the
Spaniards were defeated everywhere, although their guerilla warfare
continued to offer much opposition to the French.
1. Napier, Peninsula Battles, p. 286.
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Ciiapter VII
.
The French Rule In Spain *
When Joseph arrived at Madrid on July 10, 1808, he issued a
proclamation announcing his accession to the Spanish people, and de-
claring his intention to direct all his energies to securing their
welfare. The very form of the proclamation asserted his intention
to pose, not as a king set up by the Kevolution, but as the legiti-
mate successor of the old icings of Castile and Leon.-^ He signed Yo,
el Re and described himself as Don Joseph, by the Grace of God, King
of Castile, Aragon, the two Sicilies, Jerusalem, Navarre, Toledo,
Valencia, Galicia, Majorica, Seville, Cordova, Murcia, Santiago, the
Algarves, Gibra,ltar, the Canary Islands, the West and East Indies,
the Islands of the Ocean and Terra Pirma, Count of Haps burg, Tyrol
and Barcelona, and Lord of Biscay. It was the traditional roll of
titles dating from the empire of Charles V, and Joseph placed it at
the head of his proclamation without asking the advice of his broth-
er, who thought it ridiculous.
A constitution had already been drafted for Spaixi, and Joseph
took part in the final deliberations upon it.^ The King was to
govern with the hel^: of a Senate, a Council of State, and a Cortes.
The latter was to represent all classes; it was to meet at least once
in three years and vote a triennial budget. The colonies were to
1. Atteridge, Napoleon* s Brothers , p. 187.
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send deputies to the Cortes, and all internal customs -houses on the
borders of the old provinces were to be suppressed.
1
Joseph was a man of a kindly, easy disposition, somewhat of an
optimist, and his optimism made him entertain a very high opinion of
himself.^ In spite of adverse opinions he was to all intents kindly
disposed toward his subjects. Above all he desired to be considered
a Spanish King and not a usurping French prince, placed on the throne
by his brother's might. As an earnest of his intentions, Joseph
gave most of the appointments to Spaniards. The cabinet was made up
for the most part of the Spariish ministers who had formerly served
under Charles.^ They were: Don Urquiqo, minister of foreign affairs
Don Azanza, minister to the Indies; Don O'Ffarill, minister of war;
Don Jovellanos, minister of Interior; and Don Mazareda, minister of
Mari ne
.
Under Josei;h*s rule the following changes were made: All mon-
asteries were abolished, the Inquisition was done avv'ay with; and all
titles of Old Castile were abolished.^ In short, a complete revolu-
tion of the institutions and administration was accomplished, but
unfortunately the men who were charged with the execution of the pro-
jects were themselves too much accustomed to the ancient system, to
give the new projects any great help.5 it had been different in
Naples, where Joseph had trained French ministers to help him. The
coinage was improved, and Napoleon urged Joseph to
1. Atteridge, Napoleoxi's Brothers , p. 189.
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1circulate his own coin, inorder to produce a good political effect.-*-
Hov«rever, the reforms tnat Joseph attempted were not well receiv-
ed by the people thruout Spain, and his promise to secure the inde-
pendence of Spain and the integrity of its territory was laughed to
scorn. A rival goveriiment was formed at Seville, to which most of
the people outside of Joseph's immediate jurisdiction gave instant
sanction. Thruout his short reign, Joseph was always financially
j
embarrassed. It was Napoleon's policy that war should pay for war,
and inasmuch as the open country was in the hands of the insurgents,
he could raise neither imposts nor requisitions from it. The only
regular income that he could procure for a long time was tiiat which
came in from the local taxes of Madrid, and a few other large towns
of which he was in secure possession. And save in the capital itself,
his agents and intendants aad to fight hard with the military gover-
nors to secure this meagre sum. The King could not command a quarter
of the amount which was required for the ordinary expenses of govern-
ment. His ministers failed to receive their salaries, and the Span-
ish army, which he endeavored to form, could not be clothed or armed,
much less paid. This vexed Joseph, for he wished to make himself
independent of his brother's generals, by raising a large force which
could be under his personal disposition. He formed the cadre of
regiment after regiment, and filled them with deserters, and any
prisoners who could be induced to enlist under his banner, inorder to
avoid transportation to France. Josej^h was deceived in his expecta-
tions, for in a few weeks they would desert and join the gu.erillas.
Napoleon declared that it was folly to arm the Spaniard, who would
1. Confidential Correspondence , V. II, p. 42.
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carry off arms and desert to the rebels. "I cannot," he said, ''have
men serving in the royal Spanish army beside my own troops, after
having reddened tneir hands with Prench blood. "-^ Ho amount of pam-
pering would have turned the King's Spanish levies into loyal ser-
vants .
The only means by which Joseph could carry on trie government was
the confiscation of property belonging to the monastic orders, and to
all persons who were connected with the Junta. This would have net-
ted him a great apiount of money, if only he could have found suitable
buyers. It vraa not safe to pay much ready cash for lands overrun by
insurgents, or for houses in towns which were practic-tlly in a state
of siege. For that reason property of immense value was sold for
insignificant sums. Josexjh was looked at askance by the church -lov-
ing Spaniards because he decreed the abolition of the religious or-
ders, with the result that he axid his ministers worked in vain for
the interests of the people.
Thus the financial and administrative affairs of Joseph's govern
ment went from bad to worse. Ho matter what he was willing to do for
Spain, the majority of the people would not have anything to do with
him, because he was a foreigner. Joseph believed that he could ac-
complish a great deal by making a campaign into Andalusia. A brill-
iant campaign, in which he would figure as commander-in-chief as well
as king, might at last convince the Spaniards of his capacity. He
was prepared to play the part of a merciful and generous conqueror.
At the worst the revenues of wealthy Andalusia would be a godsend
1. At te ridge, Uapo leo n' s m-o thers
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to his depleted treasury. As was noted in a previous chapter, Joseph
invaded Andalusia with 61,000 men. The Junta, which claimed to
govern Spain, had long been established at Seville, which had thus
become a rival capital to Madrid. To drive out the Junta and conquer
the cities of the kingdoms of Granada, Seville, and Cordova, would
give Joseph much prestige.^ He believed that there existed a large
party in Andalusia which was tired of the vvar and ready to rally to
his government in case of victory, if they could only be assured of
generous treatment. So sure was Joseph of triumphal entries into the
cities of Andalusia that he took with him most of his ministers, his
chamberlains and equerries, rds carriages and plate, the ceremonial
uniforms for his guard, and rich hangings for improvised halls of
state .
^
Joseph was received v/ith apparent enthusiasm by the people. He
entered Seville on February first, where the inhabitants received
him with open arms; the churches pealed their bells, flowers fell in
showers from every window. »^ A Te Deum was sung at the Cathedral, and
the captured eagles and banners which Dupont had lost at Baylen were
restored by the bishoj^s and canons. Indeed, Joseph created a favor-
able impression upon the people, aiid many hastened to do him homage.
Thus encouraged, he issued an amnesty to the people of Andalusia if
they would desert the Junta. All political prisoners were to be
liberated, and those who chose to serve in the royal army would retail
1. Atteridge, Nappl ep n/ s Brothers . p. 247.
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their rank. All civil officers who took the oath of allegiance would
be retained in their emx)loyments
.
While Soult was besieging Cadiz, Joseph spent the months of
February and March in a circular tour thru Andalusia, where he affect-
ed to notice nothing but friendly feelings among the people. He
visited Ronda, Malaga, Granada, Jaen, hearing Te Deums, and giving
bull -fights and banquets. It is certain that a sufficient show of
submission was made to nourish his happy illusions as to the results
of his conquests. It is believed that Joseph* s friends took great
pains to orgaiiize loyal demonstrations and that care was taken to
prevent the occurrence of any unpleasant iiicidents.^ Joseph did his
best to fulfill his promises to the inhabitants, and to all outward
appearances everything promised v/ell. But as soon as Joseph was gone,
or had his back turned, the French troops misbehaved, and levied all
sorts of contributions and exactions upon the inhabitants. The King
was powerlesR to resist the open violations of tne promises which he
was giving daily. In despair he appealed to his brother, and begged
that the worst offenders be disgraced and sent to Prance.'^ But
j
ITapoleon disregarded his appeals, saying that Spain must be treated
like a conquered country; and that the amy must live off the land.^
The Emperor was not pleased that Joseph had undertaken an expedition
without his permission, one whi ch, .moreover, did not materially aid
the plans for the conquest of Spain. Furthermore he was displeased
with Joseph's plan of conciliation; he v/rote to his brother that it
1. Atteridge, Napoleon'
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was folly to release prisoners, who should rather "be sent to French
fortresses.^
Joseph wished to treat with the ceiitral Junta ^hut his deputa-
tion was not received: The Junta replied, **The City of Cadiis, faith-
ful to its principles, recognises no king but Ferdinand VII. He
then returned to Madrid where he was confronted by Napoleon* s dis-
agreeable decree of February 8.
Napoleon had complained that he could not bear the expenses of
his army in Spain any longer. Inorder to carry out his project, the
administration of tne conquered . provinces was to be in the future in
the hands of military commanders, inorder that all their resources
might be applied to the maintenance of the army. The six military
governments which were instituted as a result of Napoleon *s decree
of February 8, 1810, are as follows :2 First government, Catalonia
(Duke of Tarentum, governor); second government, Aragon (General
Suchet, governor); third government, Navarre, (General Dufour, gov-
ernor, later replaced by General Reille); fourth government, the
provinces of Biscay (General Thouvenot, governor); fifth government,
Eurgos, (General Lorsenne, governor); sixth government, Valladolid,
Placentia and Toro, (General Kelleman, gove nor )
.
The newly inaugurated military governments were under the abso-
lute control, civil as well as military, of the six French generals,
who corresponded with Napoleon and were virtually independent of
1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers
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Joseph.-^ In a letter to Berthier, Napoleoii said "that the provinces
under French occupation afford sufficient resources for the main-
tenance of French troops; that they must not trust to the French
treasury, which is exhausted by the immense sums which it is obliged
to send out; that Spain swallows up a prodigious amount of specie
and thus impoverishes France."^ England took advantage of her oppor-
tunity and pointed out to the central Junta that the creation of the
six military governments was a first step to annexation, and despite
the contrary assurances of Napoleon, the Spaniards prepared to resist
on a larger scale.
^
On May 29, 1810, Napoleon issued the following decree, dealing
with the administration of the military governments.
Article I. There shall be receivers appointed by the French
Minister of the Treasury in each of the six govern-
ments, who alone shall have charge of the revenues,
arising from ordinary or extraordinary contributions
Articlell. In all the other parts of Spain, the ordinary and
extraordinary contributions intended for the army
shall be paid into the chests of the military pay-
masters.
Article III. The six receivers established in the six govern-
ments, and the paymasters acting as receivers in
the other parts of Spain, will correspond with the
receiver -general of the contributions, who will
1. Confidential Correspondence . V. 2, p. 104.
2. Memo i re s du Roi Joseph . V. 7, p. 251.
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t
45-
reside at Bayorine .
Article IV. All the generals, intendants, and civil and mili-
tary officers in the armies, are expressly ordered
to have the contributions paid only into the receiv-
er's chests for the six governments, and into the
paymaster's chests for the other parts of Spain.
Article V. The receivers appointed by any other authority than
that of the Minister of the Treasury will cease their
functions as soon as this decree is made public, and
will repair to Paris, and carry all the papers con-
taining accounts of their receipts and expenditures
to the Minister of tiie Treasury.
Article VI. Our Chief of Staff, and our ministers of public
treasury and war are charged with executing the de-
cree as it coxicerns them respectively.-^
Upon the issuance of this decree, Joseph complained bitterly
that his power was taken away from him. He wrote to Napoleon. "Let
rae either be a king in a way that befits a brother of your 1</Iajesty or
let me return to Mortefontaine, where the only happiness I siiall ask
for is to live without huiniliation and to die with a peaceful con-
science.^ Joseph was urged to resign the crown by his friend and
adviser Count Miot de Mel i to, who said, "you. should seize this oppor-
tunity to separate your fortuities before all Europe from the Emperor's,
and cast upon their real author the responsibility for the misfor-
tunes of Spain. Fortune herself seems to have arranged this favor-
1. Memo ires du Roi Joseph , V. 7, pp. 289-291.
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able opportunity for you. A brilliant campaign, the welcome given
you in Andalusia, the brilliant and moderate policy you have pursued,
would all combine to make your retirement appear to be an act inspired
by reason of self sacrifice, and perhaps the people will do you the
honour of expressing some regret for your departure, or at least give
you their sincere good wishes.
However, Joseph did not abdicate, for he clung to power in the
hope that the Spanish resistance would tire itself out, and that the
English would be driven aw^ay, so that civil government would replace
martial law% and then he v/ould be enabled to rule according to his o^im
ideas. But he was sadly mistaken and his patience was soon at an end.
The following is a summary of his complaints, written on August 8; it
is absolutely reasonable, and confines itself to hard faots. "Since
your Majesty withdraws Andalusia from my sphere of command and orders
that the revenues of that province should be devoted exclusively to
military expenses, I have no choice but to throw up the game. In the '
actual state of affairs in Spain the general who commands each pro- 1
vince is its king. All its resources become inadequate, because what
are called the wants of the army are indefinite, and the general in-
creases them as he sees the means of supplying them. As a result, any!
province under the comjnand of a general is useless for my budget. In
Andalusia alone I hoped to find a few resources, after having assign-
ed to the army what v;as supposed to be sufficient, if your Majesty
continues to send two millions a month. But to give the command of
the troops to a general who does not recognize my authority, is to
give him the administration and the government of the country. It is
1. Atteridge, Napoleon's Brothers , p. 252.
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to take away from me the only province in which I could hope to live:
it is to confine me to Madrid, which gives me only 800,000 francs per
month, while my indispensable expenses exceed 4,000,000 per month.
I am here surrounded by the ruins of a great nation. I have a guard,
a depot, hospitals, a garrison, a household, a ministry, a privy
council, refugees from all the other provinces, etc This state of
things cannot last. If the Army of Andalusia is taken away from me,
what shall I be? The porter cf the hospitals of Madrid and of the
A
depots of the army, and the jariitor of the prisoners!" Joseph then
states his terms: (l) If the army is put under his control; (2) if
he can send back uncontrollable officers; (3) if he can have his own
way in governing the Spaniards: he v/ill retain his crown, and pledge
himself to reduce all Spain, "and make the country as profitable to
the interests of France as it is now detrimental." If not, the only
expedient is to retire across the Pyrenees and surrender his crowrx.^
However, Napoleon could not give him any such promises: in the
first place, Joseph* s military attainments were distrusted, and men
like Soult and Massena would not obey his orders. Neither could
Joseph be allowed to abdicate, at least not just at this moment. The
fact is, that at this time Napoleon decided to dismember Spain. The
following letter to his Foreign Minister Champagny, indicates his
intentions clearly. "Herewith I send you back the Spanish documents
with six observations, which are to serve as the basis for negoti-
ation. But it is important that you broach the matter gently. You
must at first state ray intentions in regard to the Convention of
Bayonne (viz. that the Emperor regards his promise of the integrity
1. Melnoires du Koi Joseph V. 7, pp. 307-311.

of Spain as out of date and cancelled). Then speak of Portugal, and
next of the expense that this country (Spain) costs me; let them re-
flect over that; and only after an interval of several days tell them
that I must have the left bank of the Ebro , as an indemnity for the
money and all else that Spain has cost me down to this hour. I think
that, as in all negotiations, we must not show ourselves too much in
a hurry. "1
In a letter to Laforest, the ambassador at Madrid, Napoleon gave
his reasons for disregarding his oath made to Joseph at Bayonne, when
he named him King of Spain. "When the promise was made, His Majesty
had supposed that he rallied to his cause the majority of the Spanish
people. This has not proved to be the case, for the whole nation
took to arms. The King, chased from his capital by the people, had
to be restored by Prench bayonets. Since them he has hardly rallied
a recruit to his cause; it is the 400»000 French sent across the
Pyrenees who have control of the provinces; therefore all the places
belong to the Emperor by right of conquent. He therefore intends to
regard the Treaty of Bayonne as being null; inasmuch as it was never
ratified by the Spanish people. Let the King prevail upon the newly-
assembled Cortes at Cadiz to acknowledge him as their sovereign, and
to break with England. If that be done, the Emperor may revert to
his first intentions, and ratify the Treaty of Bayonne, except that
he must insist on a rectification of frontier sufficient to give him
certain indispensable positions.
Joseph was driven to despair by the brother's intentions^ "The
1. Correspondence De ITapoleon . V. 21, p. 95.
2. Ibid. p. 261-262.
1

-49-
Spanish nation," he wrote, "is more compact in its opinions, its pre-
judices, its national egotism, than any other people of Europe. Theri
are no Catholics nor Protestants here, no new or old Spaniards; and
they will all suffer themselves to be cut to pieces rather than allow
the realm to be dismembered. My only chance here is to be authorized
to announce that the promise that Spain should not be dismembered
will be kept. If that is granted, and the generals who have misbe-
haved are recalled to France, all may be repaired. If not, the only
hciiourable course for me is to retire into private life, as my con-
science bids me, and honour demands.""^
The crisis never came to a head. The annexation of the Ebro
provinces was to be published only on condition that the Trench army
v/as in secure possession of Portugal, after the complete defeat of
the English. 2 At the Lines of Torres Vedras, Massena was brought to
a standstill, with the result that Joseph saved his crown, and Spain
was kept from dismemberment.
Joseph spent the winter of 1810-11 in a state of mental anguish,
expecting every day to be forced to publish his abdication, and
meanwhile living a life of shifts and worries,- selling his last sil-
ver plate to feed his courtiers, and exchanging an endless correspon-
dence of remonstrances and insinuations with Soult and the other
commanders of the military governments of the North. In particular
King Joseph complained about Kellerman's government. He states that
1. Memo ires du Roi Joseph , V. 7, p. 355.
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the general iiaa set up a criminal tribunal which is very partial
and corrupt.^ Furthermore he coraplaias that justice may be bought,
and that prisoners are procuring their release by paying ransons. '
As a result Valladolid wtisaicentre of anarchy because of Kellerraan'a
corrupt government. Napoleon made a thorough inquiry into the char-
ges, and punished numerous officers for peculations and trafficking
in prisoners.*^ Napoleon stated himself that there were more rob-
beries in Kellerman*s government than anyv/here else in Spain.
Joseph wrote to his wife, "if this present sy8te\'i is not changed,
Spain will soon be a blazing furnace, from which no one will be able
to extricate himself with honour. They do not understand this nation
it is a lion which one can lead with a silk thread by acting reason-
ably, but which a million soldiers cannot reduce by force. Everyone
here is a soldier, if one tries to rule by military force, but every
one will be a friexid, if one speaks to them of the independence of
Spain, the freedom of her people, the constitution, and the Cortes.
While Joseph always talked about abdicating, the following let-
ter from his friend Miot de Melito will throw some light upon his
reluctance to surrender the crown. "It was easy to see that the name
of King had still a powerful attraction, from which Joseph could not
escape, and I wondered at the glamour and intoxication which hangs
about supreme power, since the mere shadow of that power could over-
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weigh with him so many rebuffs and so much resentment."^
Nothing was done for several months, till in April Joseph, tak-
ing the opportunity of a formal invitation to become one of the god-
fathers of the newly -born King of Rome, the heir of the Empire, made
an unauthorii^^ed visit to Paris. He started from Madrid on April 23.
He made great haste on his ^oxxruey, lest he be stopped on the way by
orders from his brother. Joseph arrived in Paris on May 15 and pre-
sented himself before his angry brother. Then followed a series of
interviews in which Josepa declared that he would not go back to a
country where he was so badly treated, and where the administration
was so irregular. He said, "My first duties are for Spain, I love
France as (I do) my family; Spain as ray religion. I am attached to
the one by the affections of my heart, arid to the other by my con-
science."- Mapoleon, however, talked Joseph out of his project of
abdication and assured him that the military governments would soon
cease; that they produced a good effect upon England, which offered
to evacuate Portugal, if the French troops would evacuate Spain; that
England would recognize him as King of Spain if the Spaniards would.
^
The military commanders were to be placed under Joseph* n orders; the
Cortes was to be assembled, and the French troops were to evacuate
Spain as soon as possible. Furthermore a loan of 1,000,000 francs
was to be made each month.
Joseph returned to Madrid on July 15, and busied himself with
the work of administration. A committee of five was appointed to
1' Quoted from Oman. V. 4, p. 218.
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bring the Cortes together. This was an immense task.- Joseph was
willing to let the people regulate the right of succession, "but all
hope of peace vanished when it was announced that Catalonia was to be
annexed to France on January 25, 1812. Thus Joseph* s planning went
for nought, for the people feared that the rest of Spain would be
annexed at a convenient opportunity .'^ In spite of the promises made
to the King at Paris, the generals would not obey Joseph, and went on
their ways as before. They regarded themselves at petty kings, and
each resented any interference with his proceedings in his own dis-
trict. They thought chiefly of enrichixig themselves and their fav-
orites at the expense of the people.
Catalonia was divided into four departments, with a prefect for
each department. A civil government was substituted for a military
regime. However, the military officers put all sorts of obstacles
in the way. M. Roujoux the prefect of the department of the Ter
found out that the garrison was plundering the peocle, aiid complained
to the commandant, General Prost. The latter entered Roujoux's of-
fice and threatened to kill him if he forwarded any accusations
against his raen.*^ At Olot a drunken soldier fired a shot into a
peaceful group of Spaniards, and was roughly handled. The troops
were sent to sack the town for an hour, and the municipality was fin-
ed 60,000 francs.'^ The French prefects were everywhere powerless to
prevent such outrages, in what was novf officially French territory
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under regular civil administration. What could a Spanish official do
to check a French general in a district under martial law? The gen-
erals defied even the King, and levied contributions on the money
forwarded to him from Paris. Prom a convoy of 500,000 francs in gold
and silver, which passed thru Northern Spain on its way to Madrid, a
general requisitioned 120,000 francs for the immediate needs of his
army.^
Let us now turn to the Spanish Cortes which met on September 24,
1810, at Cadiz. Early in 1811, a commission was appointed to draw up
a fundamental political coi.stitution for Spain. In January 1812, the
Cortes adopted the new constitution, which was expected to regenerate
Spain. 2 The ideas in the main were borrowed from the Prench* The
monarchy was to be hereditary under the parliamentary system. The
legislative power was vested in one chamber; the King was to be con-
trolled by ministers responsible to parliament. The latter was to be
elected indirectly on a residential manhood suffrage. It was to meet
yearly. Under the new constitution the King was practically power-
less. But when Ferdinand had been restored, he made light of the
constitution, and by a coup d* etat , the despotism of 1807 was restor-
ed.3
At the end of March, 1812, Joseph was appointed commander-in-
chief of all the armies in Spain, with Jourdan as his chief of staff.
All political and military affairs in Spain were to be in Joseph's
hands. As a matter of fact, Joseph's power was purely nominal, for
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the marshals completely ignored him. They refused to cooperate with
him and continued to send war reports to Paris. Joseph could not
remove any officer, and all he could accomplish, while Uapoleon was
in Russia, was to send adverse reports to the War Office.-'-
Napoleon endeavored to patch up a truce with England on the "ba-
sis of mutual concessions in Spain. Joseph was to convoke a Cortes,
and to invite delegates of the insurgent government at Cadiz to join
it, and then secure a vote recognizing him as King of Spain. Cata-
lonia was to be given "back to Spain, and the House of Braganza was
to be restored in Portugal. The British and French armies were to
retire from the Peninsula. But the plan fell thru, for England would
not countenance it.- Soon afterward Joseph was forced to abandon
Madrid, and later Spain, as a consequence of the battle of Vittoria
on July 8, 1813. From that time, the French rule was at an end.
Summing up the French rule in Spain, we find that the military
governments on the whole were inefficient and corrupt, inasmuch as
the generals sought to better their ov/n personal welfare, instead of
working together for the French cause. Nothing definite may be said
about Joseph's own particular government, for he was not given a
fair chance to conduct it as he desired. Judging from his previous
experience in Naples, it is safe to assume that if he had been given
more authority, Spain would have enjoyed a better government than
under the military re'gime. For Joseph appears to have been a man,
who even in the face of his brother's wrath, desired above all things
to improve the condition of the Spanish people.
1. Atteridge, Napoleon* s Bro thers
. p. 298.
2. Ibid .
,
p. 299.
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Chapter VIII
.
The grench Offensive In 1810 .
There is no doubt tnat Kapoleon needed and deaired peace for his
war -ridden empire, but England would not acquiesce unless France
should give up most of his conquests. At this rnoment if appeared as
if Napoleon disliked arduous work, for he vvas loath to leave the
comforts of Paris; and after the ^A/agram campaign he had ample oppor-
tunity to return to his armies in Spain. Instead, he 'vas so confi-
dent of ultimate success, that he left the task to his lieutenants.
Nujnerous reinforcements were sent to Soult, who was later superseded
by Massena. The Array of Spain was thoroughly reorganized. It nov/
consisted of eight corps: the Array of Catalonia under Augereau; the
Army of Aragon under Sue he t; the Army of Andalusia under Soult, with
Victor, Sebastiani and Mortier; the Army of Portugal under Massena,
with Reynier, Ney and Junot; while Joseph had the Array of the Centre.
Joseph now enjoyed a few months of comparative peace. In order
to bring his kingdom uixder control, he persuaded Napoleon against
his better judgment to reduce the rich province of Andalusia. That
was a bad move; Portugal snould nave been freed first, and the Eng-
lish army decisively beaten; until that was accompli saed, Joseph
could not afford to leave the main project in abeyance. It was
Napoleon* ;-i original intention to send an array on Lisbon, with Soult
cooperating from the South, but fate ordered it o thervv^i se .
-
Speed and decision was needed to reduce Andalusia, but neither
1. Dodge, Napoleoii
.
V. 3, p. 381.
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was forthcoming. Soult set out with 50,000 men, and encountered
faint resistance in the beginning. The Spaniards under Areizaga
were signally defeated by Sebastiani on the heights of Llontizon.
Lialaga, Cordova and Granada were all occupied, and it seeiaed as if
the French would triumph everywhere. However Joseph tarried long
enough to afford the Spaniards sufficient time to fortify Cadiz,
which was the main objective of the invader'3. Without Cadiz in their
possession, the French expedition wag a failure. Instead of march-
ing on Cadiz, Joseph marched upon Seville and tool; it on February 1.
Satisfied with his parade manoeuvres, he then returned to iladrid.^
Soult marched upon Cadiz, but it was already too late. After
long deliberations, the Spaniards permitted the English to land a
division of troops under General Graham, who prevented the French
from taking the city. This was a great blow to lilapoleon's Continen-
tal system. What Napoleon desired was to make Spain anti -British;
his main object was to close the Spanish ports to the English, and
now this seemed further off tnan ever. Soult blockaded Cadiz, and
bombarded the city with 300 guns, but it was of no avail, for the
city could not be taken witn the British fleet behind it. That the
Spaniards were on the whole indifferent to the progress of the French
may be seen in General Graham* s remarkJ "They wished the English
would drive the French away, that they might eat strawberries at
Chilana."^ In the meantime, Napoleon divined the true situation and
cautioned Soult. "There is in Spain nothing dangerous except the
English. .. .If you leave on the Tagus too weak a corps, you will
1. Dodge, Napoleon
.
V. 3, p. 384.
2. iiapier. Peninsula Battle s, p. 61.
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comproaiise the campaign."^
In the meantime Wellington was perfecting his plana in Portugal,
while Soult was wasting his time in pacifying Andalusia. It was for
the French, and not the Englisn or the Spaniards to undertake an
offensive, and if Napoleon believed that the Spaniards would be worn
out eventually, he misconstrued the national character as well as the
strength of the English. By April, Wellington had concentrated
30,000 British and Portuguese troops, all under British officers.
Elaborate preparations were mcide to lay waste the land to oppose any
French invasion.
Napoleon deliberated a long time before he could find a suitable!
leader for' his new offensive. Massena seemed to be the only logical
candidate. Junot was brilliant but unsteady; Soult had shown lack
of energy; Ney was a brilliant officer, but restless in temper.
Masseaa was a soldier of considerable worth and had seen much service
under Napoleon. Although tired of war, he was finally persuaded by
Napoleon to take tne supreme commaxid, with the understanding that he
be furnished with a sufficient number of troops. Massena reached
Salamanca in May. He reorganized his army so that it soon became a
vital force.
There was frictioxi from the very start, for Mas!-:ena was disliked
by Ney and Junot, who wished to march straight on Lisbon, contrary
to Massena' s orders. By order of Napoleon, Almeida and Ciudad
Rodrigo were to be taken first. This task was left to Ney^ who pos-
sessed great energy and boldness when left to himself. Great diffi-
culty was experienced in procuring siege material, but v/hen it be-
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 335.
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came available, IJey proceeded upon his task with great rapidity and
success. Ciudad Rodrigo surrendered on July 10, after its coromander
Herrasti made a spirited resistance to the French bombardments.^
Ney then advanced on Almeida, whicn was defended by 6,000 Portuguese
and a small Sritish force. The garrison was forced to surrender on
August 27, wnen the citadel was destroyed by an explosion of its
o
magazine.*" Taus Hey seized the most important door in the north of
Portugal.
In accordance with his plans, V/ellington preferred to maintain
the defensive, ratner than the offensive. Aware that French success
depended not only upon good roads, but victual along these roads, he
devastated the entire district in which they were to operate, iiills
and bridges were destroyed, cattle were driven away, and all provi-
sions were carried off by the populace, whicli retired towards the
Torres Vedras lines. The orders of V/ellington had produced a desert.
Unhappy Portugal suffere ci much more from its allies than from the
invaders, at least for the time being.
Massena undertook his great advance in earnest during the month
of September. His forces amoumied to 64,000 men and 84 guns.
Massena hovirever, moved too slowly to suit Napoleon, who wrote to
Berthier on September 29. "Make him understand that it is my inten-
tion that he should attack and overturn the British. It is ridicu-
lous if 25,000 English should hold in the balance 60,000 French. I
am too distant, and the position of the enemy changes too often, for
me to give counsel in the manner of delivering the attack, but it is
1. Napier, Peninsula War, p. 277.
2. Ibid
,
p. 298.
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certain that the enemy is out oi" coiiditioii to resist.""
Iiiorder to strengthen toe morale of the British troops and his
allies, which had suffered by the fall of Ciudad Rodrigo and Almeida,
Wellington determined to make a staiid at Busaco . The position was
well selected; it was suitel for the defensive tactics which he had
emi^loyed at Talavera. Tne position should have been turned, and not
attacked, but the Prench were so eager to fight, that they had for-
gotten the lesson at Talavera.
Early in the morning of September 27, Reynier advanced in two
columns up the San Antonio road. He delivered his assault fearless-
ly, but try asthey would, the i'rench could not live thru the storm
of grape and canister which nurled thera back, as they reached the
summit all out of breath and in disorder. Tnere was no time for any
grand tactics, it was simply the assault of a fortified position,
where fresh troops succeeded in checking their assailants by their
heavy volleys.
Two hours later Ney delivered his usual imjjetuous attack; here
again the English had the advantage in being fresh, and able to mass
troops where it was necessary. The French were hurled back and suf-
fered a total loss of 4,500; the allies lost but 1,330.^ Massena
found himself in a bad position, for his supplies were low, and the
country was not suited for a advance. A retreat at this moment
might have degenerated into a most disastrous rout. Luckily for
Masseiia, a peasant informed him of a road which led across the hills
by the Boyalva Pass to the West. It tapped the main road from Oporto
1. Dodge, Napoleon . V. 3, p. 389.
12. Napier, Peninsula War , p. 303-304.
i
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to Coimbrti, and by some misadventure the allies had failed to secure
it.-^ To conceal his flanking movement, Massena indulged in some
skirmishing before Eusaco on the next day, but Wellington made no
reply. The latter perceived Massena* 3 object and retired upon Torres
Vedras.
The i'rench found no inhabitants; everyone lias been forced to
leave upon pain of death, and from Qelorico to Lisbon there was not
a mouthful, except what the fleeing Portugu.ese had been unable to
carry away and had hiduen or buried.^ Under these circumstances,
Massena' 3 campaign could promise little success. It was evident that
an army could not subsist in a desert. Massena faced the enemy's
lines but he did not dcire to venture an attacK. His forces were so
arranged that tney could De assembled witnin four hours; and in view
of this his lieuteiiants counselled retreat, but Massena would not
listen until his orders were countermanded. Affairs went from bad to
worse. In a fev/ weeks Masseiia had exhausted the entire country, and
was at his wit's end. Every living thing was eaten up. Discipline
almost ceased; it could not be enforced when men were dying of hun-
ger. Under these conditions, it was hard to keep the men together,
and many deserted.
In his haste, Massena followed Wellington tov/ards Lisbon, for
he was entirely ignorant of the Torres Vedras lines, a secret which
was not generally known even in England. Lisbon is situated on a
peninsula between the Tagus and the sea. Back of the city, across
this peiiinsula, rise two low ranges some twenty-five miles long. It
1. .Dodge, Napoleon . V. 3, p. 593.
2. Napier, Peninsula Vt'ar , p. 307.

was on thess that the lines were constructed, with a. third one in the
rear to protect an embarkation, should the other two be forced.
These extraordinary works, the revival of an antiquated system, but
well adapted to the coridi tioxis , consisted of eighty -seven connected
redoubts mostly closed by palisades, held by 60,000 men and mounting
290 guns. ^ Hill war- on the right, Crauford in the centre, Leith and
j
I
Picton on the left. With the sea for base, sure of food and supplies!
the allies within these lines could laugh the Prench to scorn. In
Wellington's case discretion was the better part of valor. The
French array liad accomplished wonders in victualling; in a letter to
Lord Liverpool, Wellington said that he could not have victualled a
single division wnere the French had fed 60,000 men and 20,000 ani-
mals more than two months.
2
Although Spain was cleared of the British by the end of 1810,
Napoleon's situation in Europe was far from being satisfactory. The
Continental System was not succeeding as well as the Emperor would
like, and by this time, Kussia became dissatisfied because of the
Treaty of Vienna arid "^he marriage with Maria Louis-Ji. Russia could
not purcnase any manufactured goods, nor could she dispose of her
surplus grain. Smuggling was resorted to on a large scale; and ill-
feeling was increased by the siezure of Lubeck by Napoleon, and es-
pecially the provinces added to tne Duchy of Vi/arsaw. The Treaty of
Tilsit was a dead letter, and at tne close of 1810, Russia and France
were antagonistic. Napoleon always deemed the Spanish situation as
a minor operation, and instead of go uig to the Peninsula himself to
1. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 39?i-94.
2. Ibid
,
p. 397.
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bring matters to a definite conclusion, he was content to langu.ish
at Paris, and make preparations against Russia.
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Chapter IX.
Tne iiesinuint^ Of Tne French Retrea t
«
By the end of March, 1811, llassiena had been five months before
the Torres Vedras lines. Napoleon had already given him pov;er to
act as he deemed best. Conditions were unbearable and it was evident
that he must retreat or suffer the consequences. Tiie army was in no
condition to fig it; discipline was gone, and inorder to get food the
soldiers resorted to pillaging. On the other hand the allies were
well-off and Wellington waited only for the retreat of tne French be-
fore he would strike.
In the meantime Soult Wcxs advancing towards Masse m, wao was
totally unaware of the movemeixt. On tne way Soult captured Olivenza
on June 2, after a siege of ten days. He then turned upon Badajoz,
the most important place in Estremadura. Badajoz lay on the left
bank of the Guadiana, and was well protected by a fort, and an en-
trenched camp. It was held by 10,000 men under Manecho, and possess-
ed sufficient provisions and munitions for six months. In the night
of February 19, Soult crossed the river and cut off a relieving force
from the fortress. After a brave resistance, the commander Manecho
was killed, and the command was t^iken over by Imas who surrendered
the place in a most treacherous manner on March 11.-^ Had Soult left
Eadajoz alone for the time being, Portugal could have been saved for
the French, but as Masseiia did not know of Soult^s operations, he was
forced into retreat. VifJiat the Marshals should have done in the first
1. ITapier, Peninsula War y p. 330-1.
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instance, was to couceiitrate their entire forces against V/ellington,
and not scatter their armies over the country.
Masseiia was in full retreat by Iviarch 6. He felt a horrible
desert behind aim. Wellington pursued witn rapidity and almost de-
feated the rear guard under Ney on the Ceira on the eleventh, and at
Casal Nova on tiie fourteentn. Without Ney's superb defence, the
French army would have been routed disastrously, and as it was, the
army was sadly demoralized, and constantly diminishing in strength.
Ney desired^ to retire upon Almeida where provisions were abun-
dant, and refusixig to obey orders, he was superseded by Loison.
Wellington followed closely, and defeated the retreating army at
Sabugal on April 5-^ Tne French lost 300 killed and 1,200 wounded.
Massena \vas compelled to retire upon Ciudad Rodrigo, which was reach
ed a few days later. Here the retreat ended, and after a short rest
the troops were put into cantoriments. That >iey was correct in his
advice that Almeida should be occupied may be seen; for Wellington
swooped down, and surrounded it before Massena was aware of the move
ment.
However, Massena did not intend to let Almeida slip out of his
hands, and after a period of reorganization, he advanced with 35,000
e
men to relieve the beleagured fortress. The English, numbering
/s
30,000, took up a strong defensive josition at Fuentes Onoro. Dis-
the
cord and /lack of one head again prevented the French from reaping a
victory. The French attacked the English positions for three da3/3,
and on the second day, it seemed as if the English would be turned
1. Napier, Peninsula .battles, p. 75.
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out of their position, but by superior concentration of troops, the
French were finally defeated with a loss of 3,000 men. The English
losses amounted to 1,800. Thus Almeida was abandoned to its fate.
During the night of llay 6, its brave commander Brennier cut his way
thru the cordon of English troops, and joined the main army.^ After
the battle of Fuentes Onoro, Wellington said that, "if Bony had been
there, we should have been beaten."^
By this time lAassena lost the confidence of his army, owing to
his quarrels with Ney, and was replaced by the much less able
Marmont, who was to work under Soult's orders. Thus ended the mili-
tary career of a famous general. He had accomplished everything he
possibly could, but since the Emperor did not fulfill his part, nor
his lieutenants either, the task assigned to nim was impossible.
Wellington's skillful management, added to his ability in employing
Fabian tactics, had secured Portugal against the French. From now
mpde
on, the English kept the country and/it their base; and it is most
probable that Russia was encouraged to rebel against French domina-
tion because of the failure in the Peninsula.
The year 1812 opened favorably for Wellington, because Napoleon
recalled many of his best officers and troops from Spain, for service
in Russia. As a result the French were considerably weakened, and
Wellington took advantage of their weakness by taking Ciudad Rodrigo
after a siege of twelve days.^ Marmont collected an army of 60,000
men, but made no effort to recapture Ciudad Rodrigo. Wellington took
1. Napier, Peninsula Wjar
,
p. 347.
2. Dodge, Napoleon , V. 3, p. 407.
3. Napier, Peninsula Battles , p. 132.

-66-
advaritage of Marmorit's inactivity aad oesieged Badajoz. The French
garrison of 5,000 under Phillipson was wel] -prepared to withstand a
long siege, and for a long time it foiled all efforts to take the
fortress. However the French could not keep up their valiant efforts
without outside assistance, and on April 5, the walls were pieiced
sufficiently to warrant a general assault. 10,000 British took part
in the assault.-^ The garrison fought nobly, for they did not care to
be confined in English prison ships. The British encompassed the
walls and chopped down the gates; they entered the town and after the
fiercest of fighting, the r*»i]inantis of the garrison "^ere forced to
surrender. The victory althougn brilliant was cos^tly; 5,000 British
fell, 3,500 of them falling in the final assault. The defence was a
compliment to French arms.
Wellington then proceeded to lay siege to the three forts at
Salamanca. Marmont and Soult united to relieve the forts with 40,000
men. After some manoeuvring back and forth, Marmont withdrew to a
distance and watched the attack upoiA the forts, which fell to Well -
|
ington on July 23. Then Marmont retreated.^ Instead of retreating
he should have offered instant battle to the English who were in des-
perate straits. Wellington said. "I have never been in such distress
as at present, and some serious misfortune mu3t happen if the govern-
ment does not attend seriously to the subject and supply us regularly
with money. The arrears and distresses of the Portugu.ese government
are a joke to us, and if our credit was not better than theirs we
should certainly starve. As it is, if we don't find mtans to pay our
bills for butcher's meat there will be an end to the war a^ once. "2
1. Uapier, Peninsula Battles
, p. 168.
2. Ibid, p. 197.
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Ead Marmont only taken advantage of Wellington's plight, the French
cause in Spain would have been different.
Although Marmont outmarched and outflanked Wellington, yet he
would not take full advantage of his opportunities. At last the two
forces met at Salamanca. They were almost equal in numbers, and to
use a French officer's expression, "40,000 men were defeated in for-
ty minutes by the English.'*-^ The battle was hotly contested on both
sides, but was won by the English because they possessed more re-
serves. Thus terminated the Salamanca operations, which produced the
following results. On the 18th of July, Marmont' s army of 40,000
men witri seventy -four guns, passed the Duerc to attack the allies.
On the 30th it repassed that river in defeat, having in those twelve
days marched two hundred miles, and fought three combats and a gen-
eral battle, in which over 11,000 men were killed, wounded or captur-j
ed. In the same period the allies with 46,000 men and sixty guns,
marched one hundred and sixty miles, and lost 6,500 men killed and
v^ounded.2
After Marmont 's defeat, Wellington entered Madrid on August 5,
where he was gladly received by the populace. In the following year,
June, 1813, the French were routed at Vittoria, with the result that
French domination in Spain came to an end. Napoleon was not dis-
couraged by these events, and desired to make peace with Russia and
England on the basis of the integrity and independence of Spain under
the existing dynasty, and the rehabilitation of Portugal under its
old rulers. Murat v^ras to keep Naples; the Bourboxxs Sicily; the rest
1. Napier, Peninsula Battles , p. 178.
2. Ibid
,
p. 198.
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to stay on the "basis of "let him keep who can. "1 In a way it was
immaterial to him who ruled in Madrid. But the proposals would not
satisfy England, for the victories during 1812-1813 encouraged the
English, who wisned to deprive IJapoleon of most of his conquests.
How their ambition succeeded, is well known. Af-er Vittoria, events
succeeded each other in rapid confusion. The French were driven out
of Spain by Wellington, wao folio v.'ed them into France.
1. Dodge, IJapoleon . V. 3, p. 437.
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